Information is "market-consistent" if agents only use market prices to infer the underlying states of the economy. This paper applies this concept to a stochastic growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. The economy with market-consistent information can never replicate the full information equilibrium, and there are substantial differences in impulse responses to aggregate productivity shocks. These results are robust to the introduction of a noisy public signal and aggregate financial markets. We argue that the principle of marketconsistent information should be applied to any model with incomplete markets. JEL classification: D52; D84; E32.
Introduction
A number of recent papers (notably Krusell and Smith, 1998) argue that market incompleteness does not much matter for the aggregate properties of DSGE models. This paper shows that, once account is taken of its informational consequences, market incompleteness does matter.
Most DSGE models assume complete information, i.e. knowledge of the current state vector. In the stochastic growth model this consists of aggregate capital and aggregate technology, quantities which are intrinsically difficult to measure directly. Radner (1979) shows that complete markets resolve this measurement problem. If markets are complete the information set consisting of market prices is invertible i.e. it reveals the states. The assumptions on markets and information are consistent with each other.
In contrast, models with incomplete markets typically simply assume the states are directly observable. We propose that the concept of "market-consistent information"
should be applied to models with incomplete markets. This paper analyses a linearised stochastic growth model with heterogeneous agents in which households have heterogeneous information sets arising from the limited set of markets they trade in. Average expectations then have persistent effects via aggregate capital, leading to a "hierarchy of expectations" (Townsend, 1983 , Woodford, 2003 , Nimark 2007 . The paper extends this methodology to allow for endogenous states and market-consistent information. This extension is a non-trivial exercise and our novel solution techniques allow the discipline of market-consistent information sets to be applied to any linearised DSGE model with incomplete markets. This paper shows that a market-consistent rational expectations equilibrium will have the following three properties. First, the equilibrium will never replicate the full information solution. As a direct consequence, the good news of a positive productivity shock must always be interpreted at least in part as the bad news that the capital stock has been over-estimated in the past. Second, for virtually all empirically plausible calibrations this bad news response dominates the short and medium term response to a productivity shock. Third, this marked contrast with the complete markets response is robust to the inclusion of a noisy public signal and aggregate financial markets There is a long tradition of the study of imperfect information in macroeconomics, a review of which can be found in Hellwig (2006) . The approach taken in this paper is distinct from recent work in explicitly drawing the link between information and markets;
showing how the hierarchy of expectations can be modelled when there are endogenous states; and finding that imperfect information has significant effects in the stochastic growth model, without the need for noisy indicators as in Lorenzoni (2010) or strategic complementarities as in Angelotos and L'ao (2009) 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Analytical results are in section 3, and numerical results in section 4 Section 5 discusses the robustness of these results, and section 6 concludes. Proofs are in Appendix A, linearizations and supplementary material in Appendix B
The model
This section presents a model of the type that is becoming standard in the dynamic general equilibrium literature 1 . There are a large number of households and a large number of firms, divided into S islands, on each of which there many firms and households. There are shocks to aggregate and island-specific labour productivity.
Upper case letters denote levels, lower case letters denote log deviations from the steady state growth path. A superscript s indicates a variable relating to a typical household or firm on island s. Without the superscript the variable is an aggregate.
Households
A typical household on island s consumes (C to firms. Household labour on each island has idiosyncratic productivity (Z s t ) whereas capital is homogenous, so households earn the aggregate return (R kt ) on capital but an idiosyncratic wage (V s t ) on their labour. Apart from the idiosyncratic shock, households on different islands are unconditionally identical.
The problem of a household on island s is to choose paths for consumption, labour supply and investment (I s t ) to maximize expected lifetime utility given by
1 Examples of papers which use similar models include Krusell and Smith (1998) and Lorenzoni (2010) .
where 1 γ is the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply, and β the subjective discount rate, subject to a resource constraint
and the evolution of the household's holdings of capital
The expectations operator for an individual household is defined as the expectation given the household's information set Ω 
The household's first-order conditions consist of an Euler equation
where R t = R kt + 1 − δ is the gross return to a one-period investment in capital, and a labour supply relation
Firms
The production function of a typical firm on island s is
where A t is an aggregate productivity shock and J s t is the capital rented by the firm:
in general, J s t 6 = K s t , since capital will flow to more productive islands. The first-order conditions of this firm are
Aggregates
Aggregate quantities are sums over household or firm quantities, and for convenience are calculated as quantities per household. For example aggregate consumption is given by
The economy's aggregate resource constraint is then
Markets
Firms on island s only rent labour from households on island s, and the wage on island s, V s t , adjusts to set labour supply (6) equal to labour demand (8). In contrast, capital is homogenous and tradeable between islands, so flows to islands with more productive labour. The aggregate return to capital, R t , adjusts to clear the capital market, making the demand for capital for each firm (8) consistent with each household's Euler equation (5) and the aggregate resource constraint (9).
Shocks
For both the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks assume autoregressive processes in log deviations:
where t and s t are i.i.d mean-zero errors, and 
Linearisation
The remainder of the paper works with the log-linear approximation to the model in order to be able to use a linear filter to model the household's signal extraction problem 2 .
Appendix B1. shows that the features of the economy relevant to a household on island s can be written as an Euler equation
and a law of motion for the economy that is symmetric across islands:
where
is a vector of underlying states relevant to a household on island s comprising aggregate states ξ t =
• k t a t¸0 and states specific to the household, given by χ
. 
The economy with full information
If complete markets exist, risk-sharing implies that consumption is perfectly correlated across households so each household also knows aggregate consumption and the idiosyncratic component of its labour income. It is then easy to show that the information set is "instantaneously invertible" -full information can be recovered using only t-dated information.
is knowledge of the aggregate states in the economy ξ t , the idiosyncratic states χ s t of all households and the time-invariant parameters and structure of the underlying model Ξ.
On the other hand, if markets are incomplete but full information is simply assumed, it is straightforward to show that the economy is identical at an aggregate level to the complete markets economy, but differs markedly at a household level 3 . This is related to Krusell and Smith's (1998) result that an economy with incomplete markets can closely resemble one with complete markets (the resemblance is exact in the model presented here because it is linearised).
However, as what follows will show, this result is in general dependent on a market-inconsistent assumption of complete information.
Market-consistent information
With only capital and labour markets the market-consistent information set of a household on island s at time t is
where Ξ contains the parameters and structure of the underlying model 4 . Define a measurement vector i
such that the information set evolves according to
Using the structural equations of the economy, 3 The permanent income response to idiosyncratic shocks implies that the idiosyncratic component of consumption is a random walk as in Hall (1978) . However, the adding-up constraint across idiosyncratic shocks (12) means that such permanent shifts in idiosyncratic consumption cancel out in the aggregate. In general, this form of uninsurable income uncertainty would be expected to cause precautionary saving which would change the steady state of the model, but these effects are precluded by linearizing. 4 Households also have knowledge of the history of their own optimising decisions, {c
however, since each of these histories embodies the household's own responses to the evolution of Ω (Townsend, 1983 , Woodford, 2003 , Nimark, 2007 , 2008 5
where the first-order average expectation W
(1) t is an average over all households' expectations of their non-expectational state vector
5 Appendix B2 provides a heuristic argument that demonstrates how the hierarchy of expectations arises from the problem of infinite regress, and illustrates why the Law of Iterated Expectations cannot be used to simplify this problem. and higher-order expectations are given by This result contradicts the simple intuition that arises from counting shocks and observables. Each household needs to identify two underlying shocks, t and s t , and has two observables, their (idiosyncratic) wage and the (aggregate) return on capital.
Since the latter is only affected by the aggregate shock, t , it might appear that t could be recovered simply from innovations to returns. The proof shows that there is indeed a fixed point of the filtering problem in which this happens; but that this fixed point is unstable. In time series terms there is a reduced form ARMA representation of r t in which t is the innovation, but this representation is "non-fundamental" (Lippi and Reichlin, 1994) , and hence t cannot be recovered from the history of r t .
The stability condition that is violated here is mathematically identical to that given by Fernandez-Villaverde et al (2007) A corollary to this result helps understand the mechanism which makes the responses differ from those under full information. This corollary can be proved for the case of fixed labour supply (γ = ∞) and also in the neighbourhood of this case i.e. for γ >γ, whereγ is finite. Numerically, the corollary appears always to hold. This result arises from the general property of optimal filters that state estimates have lower variance than states. The only source of aggregate fluctuations in the model is the technology shock. The solution to the filtering problem implies that aggregate technology must have lower variance than actual technology, so when such a shock hits, the estimate of technology must rise by strictly less than actual technology i.e. starting from a steady state in t = 0, E s 1 a 1 < a 1 . Assuming fixed labour supply to simplify things, the linearised return is, as in Campbell (1994) r t = λ (a t − k t ) and since estimates must be consistent with the information set, E
Thus each household's estimate of capital (and hence the average estimate) must fall on the impact of a positive innovation to aggregate productivity. What is unambiguously good news under full information appears to the average household to be a mixture of good and bad news.
The response to aggregate productivity shocks
While the previous section shows qualitative differences from the full information equilibrium, this section investigates their quantitative implications.
Calibration
The key parameters are the persistence and innovation variance of the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity processes 7 . Aggregate productivity is calibrated with the benchmark RBC values for persistence of φ a = 0.9 and an innovation standard deviation σ a = 0.7% per quarter (Prescott, 1986) . The calibration of idiosyncratic technology draws on the empirical literature on labour income processes. A calibration that sets idiosyncratic persistence equal to aggregate persistence (i.e. φ z = φ a = 0.9) appears consistent with recent estimates using US panel data. There is however strong evidence that idiosyncratic technology has a much higher innovation standard deviation. A figure of 4.9% per quarter is consistent with Guvenen's results 8 .
The nature of impulse response functions
The response profiles discussed in this section differ from standard impulse response functions under full information in that they show the impact of a shock to an underlying stochastic process, a t , that would be unobservable to any agents in the economy. These impulse response functions could not therefore be observed contemporaneously and the 7 The values for the standard parameters δ = 0.025; α = 0.667; β = 0.99; g = 0.005 are chosen following Campbell (1994) . The choice of log utility has already restricted the coefficient of relative risk aversion to unity. Card (1994) estimates the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply, 1 γ to be between 0.05 and 0.5. The calibration sets γ = 5, in the middle of this range. Steady state labour is taken to be H = 0.33 which implies the weight of labour in the utility function is θ = 3.5.
8 See Appendix B3. for a full discussion. Our calibration technique takes account of households' observing their own labour supply, but it can be argued that some idiosyncratic innovations to labour productivity may also be directly observable. This issue is discussed in Section 5.1 stochastic properties of the model are crucial in determining the nature of impulse response functions.
In contrast, under full information, after the initial shock has taken place, the remainder of the impulse response is equivalent to a perfect foresight path, and is thus known in advance to both observer and agents in the model. The agents in the model are continuously making inferences from new information as it emerges, and thus are uncertain not only about the value of future shocks, but also about their own future behaviour in response to past shocks 9 .
4.3 Response to an aggregate productivity shock Figure 1 shows the effect of a 1% positive innovation in the process for aggregate productivity on aggregate consumption in the baseline model and in the case of full information 10 .
Under full information consumption increases on impact. In contrast, with incomplete markets and market-consistent information, the response of aggregate consumption is significantly negative on impact of a positive productivity shock.
This response is driven by the nature of the filtering problem. Households do not observe the aggregate technology shock directly, but only the associated positive innovations to the aggregate return and the idiosyncratic wage. They then use these observed innovations to update their estimates of the states, and it is these state estimates which determine their consumption decision.
Innovations to the observed variables can occur either because of structural innova- It is not the form of impulse responses that are unobservable, but the shocks that feed into them. The assumption of common knowledge of rationality means that any household could draw Figure 1 , but no household would be able to identify contemporaneously that a productivity shock had actually occurred.
10 Appendix B4 gives details of the numerical solution method.
nology must have also been overestimated in the past 11 which, given the persistence of technology, means that the sign of the response of the estimate of aggregate technology is ambiguous. In the base case the response is positive but quite small, around 20% of the size of the true shock. If technology is slightly more persistent than in the base case (φ a = 0.93), the two effects perfectly offset and estimates of aggregate technology never change.
The response of the state estimates are shown in Figure 2 . The predominantly bad news about the aggregate economy is offset by good news on both the idiosyncratic
itself is observed, and idiosyncratic technology.
But the pure permanent income response to estimates of idiosyncratic states is small, and so the overall response is dominated by the response to the estimate of aggregate capital 12 .
Households base their consumption decisions on estimates of the state variables. The accuracy of these estimates can be assessed by the covariance matrix of one-step ahead forecasts of the states. For the baseline calibration, under full information the quarterly standard deviations of one-step ahead forecast errors for aggregate technology and aggregate capital would be 0.7% and zero respectively (since capital is pre-determined). In the base case with incomplete information the corresponding figures increase to 1.6% and 2.2%. It is striking that what seems to be a quite modest degree of uncertainty about the true value of the capital stock should be enough to cause such a significant change in the dynamics of the system, especially so, given that recent debates about the true size of the capital stock (see, for example, Hall, 2001 or the discussion of intangibles in Laitner and Stolyarov, 2003) have suggested measurement errors by statistical offices that are many orders of magnitude larger than this. The relative accuracy of households' estimates in our simple model suggests we may well be considerably understating the informational 11 To see this recall that estimates must be consistent with the information set so r t−1 = E s t−1 r t−1 . Again assuming fixed labour for clarity, this implies a t−1 −E s t−1 a t−1 = k t−1 −E s t−1 k t−1 . If the household now believes E s t−1 k t−1 was too high this implies E s t−1 a t−1 was also too high. Since technology is persistent this will reduce the response of E s t a t .problem households face.
Robustness
This section discusses the robustness of the results to changes in the key parameters, and to the introduction of a noisy public signal and additional financial markets.
Sensitivities
The informational problem is due to the market-consistent information set being insufficient for the household to distinguish between aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity processes. The key parameters of the model are therefore the properties of these processes. Changing the other parameters does not affect the nature of the informational problem.
While there is strong evidence in the data that the idiosyncratic economy is much more volatile than the aggregate, an important question is the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks are observable. In informational terms, observing some part of idiosyncratic shocks is equivalent to their having a lower variance. Table 1 shows the sensitivity of the impact response of consumption to changes in the persistence and variance of the idiosyncratic shock.
Moving from left to right across the table, the degree of heterogeneity in the economy progressively falls, with the final column being the limiting homogenous case. As the relative standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock decreases, the information problem becomes less acute, so the impact response of consumption becomes less negative.
Moving up the table, as the persistence of idiosyncratic technology rises, its unconditional variance rises so the informational problem becomes more acute with an increasingly negative impact on the response of consumption. However there is a second offsetting effect. As the process becomes more persistent, an estimated innovation to idiosyncratic productivity has a greater effect on expected wealth, so, other things being equal, the response of consumption becomes less negative. These offsetting effects re-sult in a non-monotonic relation between the persistence of persistence of idiosyncratic technology and the impact response of consumption.
A noisy public signal
The model presented so far has an informational structure which is internally consistent -in decentralised equilibrium the only source of information about aggregates are market prices -and this will never replicate the full information solution, so giving rise to welfare costs compared to full information. This could provide a rationale for the existence of other sources of information such as government statistical offices etc. The impact of such additional sources of information can be analyzed by extending the measurement vector (22) to include a public signal of output which differs from true output by a white-noise error 13 . Figure 3 shows how this signal affects the response of aggregate consumption in the model with noise in the public signal with a standard deviation ranging from 1% to 3%.
Recall that without a public signal ( Figure 1 ) the impact response of consumption was negative. With a standard deviation of the noise in the output measure at the top of the range, the impact response becomes very close to zero. As the accuracy of the signal increases, the response of consumption approaches the full information case.
Although there is currently a lively debate on the empirical effect of technology shocks, see for example Christiano et al (2003) , there seems to be some agreement that a range of variables, including consumption, respond more sluggishly in the data than in a standard RBC model. Theoretical explanations for such sluggishness (for example Francis and Ramey, 2005) are usually couched in terms of nominal or real rigidities, or habit formation.
The result of this section shows that informational imperfections can generate such a sluggish response of consumption without additional rigidities.
13 How noisy are real-time estimates of output? Orphanides and Norden (2002) attempt to quantify the extent of uncertainty by calculating the difference between real-time and final estimates. Their table 2 shows standard deviations of the difference ranging from 1% to 3% per quarter. However, they note that their method "...overestimate[s] the true reliability of the real time estimates since it ignores the estimation error in the final series", which given the issues involved in measuring output, is likely to be large but is by its nature unquantifiable.
Financial markets
Our baseline model is one without financial markets. However the techniques of e.g. Lettau (2003) can be extended to price financial assets in this model. In contrast to the shadow prices normally derived under full information, in any model with incomplete markets and market-consistent information, these prices will have an informational content and so will change the equilibrium.
As an example, consider the case of a risk-free bond. Some algebra (see Appendix B5.) shows its return, r ft is given by
where μ is the vector that relates the return on capital to the non-expectational aggregate states, M is as in (21), and X
(1) t is the first-order average expectation of the full state vector. So the risk-free rate reveals a linear combination of the hierarchy of expectations,. However in practice adding this to households' information sets barely changes the response in figure 1. The intuition for this is as follows. In the baseline calibration, with its large variance of the idiosyncratic shock, the wage conveys essentially no useful information about aggregates: the return on capital is effectively the only observable that gives information about aggregates, and all households know this to be the case. So even without a risk-free asset the hierarchy of average expectations of aggregate states is close to being common knowledge. Hence the risk-free rate conveys very little additional information, and the equilibrium is little changed. There are very similar results when a stock market is introduced 14 .
What additional assets would change these results? The first type would be assets that help households insure against, and hence identify, idiosyncratic shocks. The more of these assets there are, the easier the filtering problem until in the limit with complete 14 To price the stock assume a dividend process given by the one period return on capital as in Lettau (2003) . The pricing equation is complicated by the need to allow for the hierarchy of expectations: the law of iterated expectations cannot simply be applied in solving forward. Instead substitute out for increasingly higher orders of average expectations (along very similar lines to the methodology used by Nimark, 2007) . A closed form expression for the stock price, and hence the return, can be derived in terms of the full hierarchy, which for numerical solutions can again be truncated as outlined in Appendix B4. Precise details of the methodology are available from the authors. markets the economy collapses to the full information case (Radner, 1979) . The second type are assets which give direct information about aggregate flows. For example, in our economy gross profits are a linear function of output, so observing these would be equivalent to observing output and would reveal full information. Since capital is owned by households, a stock market in this model would not reveal this information. Actual stock markets provide information about dividend flows, but in practice dividends and output are far from being perfectly correlated. We leave further examination of this issue to future work.
The relative unimportance of aggregate assets has an interesting parallel with the results of Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) , who find that, in a model of missing markets where new asset markets are added incrementally according to the magnitude of the resulting increase in welfare, the last asset to be added is the market portfolio itself, and that all preceding assets that are added are pure swaps, since these provide the crucial rule of risk pooling. In our framework, similarly, the assets that would provide the crucial information would be those that span the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. Aggregate markets thus appear to play a marginal role both in terms of welfare and in terms of information 15 .
Conclusions
In marked contrast to the conclusions of recent research, we have shown that market incompleteness matters due to its informational consequences. It remains to be seen how robust this contrast will be to further modifications.
On the one hand it might be argued that we are overstating the informational implications of incomplete markets. Evidently markets are not so incomplete as in our model. While aggregate financial markets make very little difference, the existence of insurance and other risk-pooling markets would push these results closer to those under 15 King (1983) introduces a nominal bond into a Lucas-style monetary economy (without capital) and finds it mitigates informational problems. This is consistent with the present paper since the baseline model already has a common aggregate signal in the return on capital. The point in this section is that additional aggregate markets have little effect in a model with capital. full information.
On the other hand, it is very easy to argue that we may be significantly understating the extent of the informational problem. Our model is highly simplified, with only a single source of idiosyncratic uncertainty; symmetry across households; and a single aggregate endogenous state variable. Other models have more shocks and more states (for example Smets and Wouters, 2007 , has seven shocks and four states) which will make the filtering problem of the household more complex, but may also have more sources of information. A striking feature of our model is how well households can estimate the capital stock, in stark contrast to the observed wide variation in estimates within the academic debate (e.g., Hall, 2001) , which, it might be argued, reflect the much greater complexity of the true inference problem.
While our results are specific to the stochastic growth model, the principle of marketconsistent information is much more general, and should be applied to any model of incomplete markets. x-axis shows periods; y-axis shows percentage deviations from steady state 
The …rst block of four equations, for the non-expectational states, can be derived straightforwardly by substitution from (A.2) into (14), giving
It is evident that .7) where is the Kalman gain matrix 3 (yet to be determined), and
where, using (17) and (A.2)
Substituting (A.4) and (A.8) into (A.7) gives 
Under Assumption 1, each household knows that every other household will apply a symmetric updating rule. Hence, averaging (A.11) across all agents gives, using (A.3),
(A.12)
These matrices censor out idiosyncratic components that average to zero, using (12). Then using (A.2) to substitute out for aggregate consumption:
(A.14)
Stacking this under (A.5) and comparing with (A.4) shows that M and N must satisfy
Thus the process for the states depends on the solution to the typical household's (yetto-be-solved) …ltering problem, as well as on the solution to the optimal consumption problem.
To solve the …ltering problem, conditional upon , M and N (which from the perspective of any individual household are exogenous structural parameters), exploit Baxter et al (2009) Propositions 1 and 2, which state that the solution to this problem is the same as that of a parallel problem for household s in which each household solves the …ltering problem as if their own decisions had no impact on their own idiosyncratic states i.e. setting F s = 0 ) L = 0. This implies that satis…es To express r t+1 in terms of the state vector write
where H is as de…ned in (A.9) so that E
. Then, substituting this and (A.1) into the Euler equation gives
Taking expectations of (A.4) then substituting for E .23) implying that must satisfy
Thus an equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1, and the conditions for a recursive competitive equilibrium in De…nition 2, is a …xed point of (A.6), (A.15), (A.16), (A.17), (A.18), (A.9) and (A.24).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1, (Non-Replication of Full Information)
The proof proceeds by showing there is a …xed point of the Kalman …lter that replicates full information, such that state estimates are equal to the actual states, E s t X s t = X s t , but that this …xed point must be unstable i.e. the Kalman …lter can never converge to it.
At this …xed point the hierarchy of expectations collapses, such that W
8k (since the true idiosyncratic states sum to zero if these are correctly observed so will all expectations thereof). This implies that, for any household s;
the covariance matrix of one-step ahead forecast errors for the full state vector, must satisfy
where a star indicates a value at the …xed point, and, using the de…nition of T W in (A.13) N = 2 6 6 6 6 4 .27) i.e., all uncertainty in the state vector relates to the true one-step-ahead uncertainty of the non-expectational states, but the matrix T W censors out any impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty on the idiosyncratic components of the hierarchy, which equal zero at the …xed point. Substituting into (A.18) implies
which in turn must imply (since M 6 = 0);
post-multipling both sides by H and solving gives
Write Q; the rank-de…cient covariance matrix of underlying structural disturbances, as 
To proceed further, conjecture that, at the …xed point the full hierarchy of expectations is common knowledge. If this is the case aggregate consumption must also be common knowledge. Thus Baxter et al (2009) can be exploited to solve a parallel …ltering problem in which both the law of motion for the states and the measurement equation ignore the impact of both idiosyncratic and aggregate consumption (i.e., set F c = F s = H c = 0): Note that this is in contrast to the general …ltering problem solved in Appendix A.1, in which aggregate consumption is not observable, and hence only F s can be set to zero. Under the conjecture substitute into (A.33) setting For this …xed point to be stable, however, …ltering errors in estimating the true nonexpectational states must converge to zero in the neighbourhood of the steady state. To examine this issue, focus solely on the parallel …ltering problem of household s with respect to W (1 (1 ) ) Thus the condition in (A.36) is not satis…ed, and …ltering errors are non-convergent in the neighbourhood of the …xed point. This means an equilibrium replicating the full information equilibrium is unstable both in the conventional sense that small deviations will lead to divergence from equilibrium and in the sense that the Kalman …lter will never converge to it 5 . So any stable equilibrium must di¤er from the full information equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1, (Impact e¤ects of aggregate productivity shocks)
Consider the impact of a positive aggregate technology shock in t = 1; from an initial steady state in t = 0: Since all households are hit by the same shock, and respond symmetrically, so will their state estimates and hence their consumption, i.e., 
A.3.1 Technology Estimates
Using the relevant row of (A.7) and the property that E s t 1 a t = a E s t 1 a t 1 the estimate of aggregate technology can be written
where L is the lag operator such that Lx t = x t 1 . The innovation to the estimate of aggregate technology can be written, using (A.4) 5 Corollary 2 of Baxter et al (2009) shows that the two senses of stability are mathematically identical.
and (A.8) as
where a picks out the relevant row of , de…ned in (A.17), and (10) and (11), (A.42) can be written A.44) for some scalars k $ and k $ s and some vector k f ; and thus .45) since the three elements in (A.44) are mutually orthogonal. E¢ ciency of the …lter requires that
so using the unconditional properties of a t and substituting from (A.41) gives
Substituting (A.45) and rearranging gives
where the inequality holds in strict form given non-replication of full information. This implies, for a unit shock to a t in t = 1; from an initial steady state, 
The parameter , de…ned in Appendix B.1, equation (B.26), depends on the intertemporal elasticity of labour, and steady state labour H, = ( ; H) ; such that (1; H) = 0 and (0; H) = (1 ) 1 .
Using these in (A.50) gives .54) and in (A.51) gives
then equating these gives
After a unit shock to a 1 ; starting from steady state, a 1 = 1; k 1 = 0; given pre-determined capital. Averaging across households gives ( 1; 1) ; hence the …rst term in the square brackets is positive. Thus with …xed labour supply ( = 0), estimated capital must fall. Given continuity, the same must also apply for su¢ ciently close to zero (hence for > ; for some …nite ), proving the Corollary.
A.3.3 A su¢ cient condition for initial capital estimates to be negative For the general case, with 2 (0; 1) i.e. that the initial average error in predicting aggregate consumption should be less than the error in predicting aggregate technology, which is strictly positive. The error in predicting average consumption will usually also be positive (since, as noted in the discussion of Section 4.3, average estimates of idiosyncratic states will both be positive) but in all the cases we have examined numerically will be much smaller than the error in predicting aggregate technology. Linearizing the production function (7) gives
B.1.3 Aggregates
Note: in general, none of the relationships derived in this section are observable to households. Linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (9)
Aggregating the capital evolution equation (B.4) across households Linearizing the resource constraint (2) for individual households, substituting for factor prices using marginal product conditions and substituting into the linearised version of the household capital evolution equation (2) First, as already noted Guvenen estimates labour income as the sum of an AR(1) and a white noise process, hence as an ARMA(1,1) in reduced form. For simplicity, the white noise element is ascribed to measurement error, and thus calibrate to the AR(1) process alone.
Second, Guvenen's estimates use annual data, whereas our calibration is quarterly. An underlying quarterly AR(1) process with persistence and innovation variance 2 "
translates to an (end-year) annual AR(1) representation with AR (1) Third, in our framework labour income, as the sum in logs of the idiosyncratic technology process, z s t and the idiosyncratic component of labour supply is a higher order ARMA process with one AR root of unity, due to the random walk nature of the idiosyncratic component of consumption, acting via the intratemporal optimality condition (B.2). Thus any stationary representation is mis-speci…ed (although the unit root component has relatively low innovation variance). We simulate the properties of this misspeci…ed regression as if it were estimated by OLS. In a su¢ ciently large sample the unit root would be expected to dominate, but in smaller samples the relatively low variance of the unit root component, coupled with the well-known downward bias in the AR parameter means that if a single AR parameter is being estimated it is in e¤ect an average of the unit root and the other stationary AR roots. The table below shows the impact of a range of combinations of sample size and z on the sampling properties of the AR(1) parameter in the mis-speci…ed AR (1) regression. The table shows that for su¢ ciently large samples the single estimated AR parameter is very close to the value of unity that must ultimately dominate large sample properties. For smaller samples, however, the estimated AR(1) parameter is well below unity, Averaging both sides across agents 
